Last time, in this series on political strategies for winning abundant housing, I wrote about preventing displacement. Here, I sketch the hidden reality of federal US housing policies: they are about real estate appreciation, not housing. And I spell out how they polarize wealth, exacerbate racial inequality, cut productivity and job creation, speed climate change, and exaggerate the ups and the downs of the business cycle. Next time, I will return to the series’ explicit focus on political strategy and how we might assemble an unusual left-right coalition to shift national policy.
For generations, the prime movers of federal housing policy in the United States—the biggest budgets, the rules that most profoundly shape the nation’s dwelling arrangements—have operated from agencies without the word “housing” in their name. The Internal Revenue Service, for example, is the premier source of housing assistance. Mortgage and securities regulators at various agencies have similarly outsized influence. The US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), in contrast, is only a bit player.
Tax code and mortgage rules indirectly lavish hundreds of billions of dollars a year on homeowners, many multiples of HUD’s $48-billion budget.
Tax code and mortgage rules indirectly lavish hundreds of billions of dollars a year on homeowners, many multiples of HUD’s $48-billion budget. And for all the nattering of US leaders about expanding homeownership and providing affordable housing, these federal policies’ actual effects have included neither increased homeownership nor more-affordable dwellings.
Instead, US tax and mortgage rules turbocharge speculation in residential real estate, exacerbating the damage caused by the overly restrictive local zoning Sightline’s green urbanism and abundant housing team regularly endeavors to reverse. These federal policies polarize wealth, exacerbate racial inequality, cut productivity and job creation, speed climate change, and exaggerate both the ups and the downs of the business cycle. They are about real estate appreciation, not housing.
US tax and mortgage rules turbocharge speculation in residential real estate, exacerbating the damage caused by the overly restrictive local zoning.
Fortunately, the incentives these rules create for speculating in residential real estate peaked a decade ago and have since ebbed modestly. In 2017, the Republican Congress took a surprising step in the right direction by reducing the mortgage interest deduction and related tax benefits. Further progress in the years ahead might be within reach.
Feed the horses to feed the sparrows
The prime movers of housing—tax breaks and mortgage finance policy—operate according to what John Kenneth Galbraith called horse-and-sparrow economics: “If you feed the horse enough oats, some will pass through to the road for the sparrows.”
The horses, in this manure-pecking analogy, are the cluster of powerful industries involved in building, selling, and financing homes. The oats are tax breaks and federal promises of bailouts should the mortgage industry overextend. And the sparrows who get the digested oats? They would be ordinary American households.
Horse-and-sparrow economics can be good politics: unlike sparrows, horses are big, powerful, and well represented by lobbyists and political action committees. The bipartisan practice in Washington, DC, has consequently long been to give the mortgage and real-estate industries generous support, hoping that the result will be homebuying by millions of sparrows. But aside from fattening the horses, this approach has largely failed.
From lend-and-hold to shadow banking
US government interventions in the mortgage business started modestly. During the Great Depression, the government invented the 30-year mortgage and created Fannie Mae to guarantee low-interest mortgages and stimulate the economy. The mortgage was elegant: a way to pay for homes with future earnings. The system was progressive, but only if you were a working class white person. Loaning practices were racially exclusionary from the beginning, the very genesis of redlining.
The mortgage business evolved over time from a boring but reliable lend-and-hold operation for local banks, credit unions, and savings and loan associations into an ever-accelerating binge that culminated in the collateralized debt obligations, mortgage-backed securities, and other bundled and securitized easy-money loans that collapsed in 2008, precipitating that year’s devastating financial crisis. The whole multi-decade spree was rationalized, when anyone bothered, as a way to extend opportunity and housing to more families: horses and sparrows.
The federal role has rarely been to provide public money up front. Instead, the US government regulates mortgage lending lightly, allowing the mortgage industry to take on enormous risks that can trigger recessions, while also implicitly guaranteeing its solvency. The mortgage industry includes not only quasi-public entities, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but also their private, “shadow banking” counterparts, such as hedge funds, insurers, and the rest of the too-big-to-fail menagerie.
Government mortgage policy works in much the same way as a rich relative cosigning a young person’s loan. If all goes well, the relative never pays; if all does not, the cost to the relative can be large. In the case of government mortgage policy, though, the guarantee is not for individuals’ mortgages. It’s for the whole industry.
All has not gone well. In the Savings & Loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s, one-third of US thrifts went bust, and the US Treasury bailed out their depositors at a cost of $130 billion. The fallout contributed to the early-nineties recession. But the S&L crisis was nothing compared with the 2008 housing bubble and the Great Recession it triggered. These calamities cost the United States many times as much in direct government bailouts to financial institutions. And they cost the world literally trillions of dollars in vanishing wealth and collapsing economies, to say nothing of human misery and ruined lives.
Financialization
Brink Lindsey of the center-right Niskanen Center in Washington, DC, and Steven Teles, a left-leaning professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, document the saga of the US mortgage industry in their 2017 book The Captured Economy. They summarize:
The track record of US regulatory subsidies for mortgage credit is thus nothing short of abysmal. Instead of offering transparent, on-budget fiscal transfers, policymakers chose to promote homeownership by channeling subsidies through financial institutions, first with the savings-and-loan industry, next with securitization and shadow banking. Both of these models of mortgage finance, designed and propped up by public policy, ended in meltdown. Apart from the ruinous costs of financial crises, regulatory subsidies chronically misallocated resources by pushing financial institutions to direct resources toward household consumption (of housing) rather than productive business investment.
Indeed, the mortgage industry, once a cautious niche industry that generated modest profits and stable housing, has become a leading force of the financialization of the US economy. Securitized home mortgages—thousands of mortgages bundled together, sliced, and recombined—are a large share of the Wall Street capital pools that constitute the shadow banking sector. The finance industry and its implicit short-termism have become ascendant in the economy, shunting investment capital into real estate and other existing assets and away from the businesses whose innovations in products and services are the engines of prosperity. Write Lindsey and Teles:
the large and destabilizing subsidies that the government bestows on debt financing and mortgage lending. . . are a major root cause of both the financial sector’s excessive growth and its recurring instability. They are the source of massive rents for financial firms and a catalyst for the excessive risk-taking that misdirects capital and periodically convulses the larger economy.
Retrenching the mortgage industry—by regulating it more tightly and revoking its implicit government guarantee of bailouts—would be a healthy step toward a better-balanced economy. It would make mortgage loans a little harder to get, a little smaller, and a little more expensive in fees and interest rates. None of this is something that home buyers would like, but it would dramatically reduce the risk of financial crises and rightsize the returns on buying real estate.
Tax breaks for home-value speculation
Mortgage policy is only half of the problem with US federal housing policy. Four parts of the US tax code also encourage real-estate speculation. Between them, these tax rules showered perhaps $150 billion on homeowners in 2020. The handouts are not structured to encourage ownership as such, or to promote stable housing, but rather to reward homeownership as an investment strategy. Because the benefits grow with incomes and home prices, they operate like Robin Hood in reverse.
American families who earn more than $200,000 a year receive federal housing assistance worth about four times as much on average as do American families who earn less than $20,000 a year.
The four parts:
- The mortgage interest deduction lets you subtract interest on your home loan (or loans, if you have two homes) from your income before you calculate your US personal income taxes. The more interest you pay, the bigger the tax break, which makes the policy steeply regressive. Reduced by Congress in 2017 (as I’ll discuss in my next article), it still cost the Treasury $26 billion in 2020.
- The state and local tax deduction (SALT) lets you remove all the nonfederal taxes that you pay from your income before tallying your federal taxes, including state and local income, sales, and property taxes. This policy functionally gives homeowners a discount on their property taxes, and like the mortgage interest deduction, the benefit grows with your income and home price. The more property tax you pay—and the higher your income—the bigger the discount. Despite being trimmed in 2017 by Congress, in 2020, the property tax portion of SALT cost the Treasury $6 billion (assuming the same ratio of property to other taxes as in past years).
- The capital gains exemption, which denies the Treasury some $35 billion a year, allows home sellers to pay no income tax on the first $250,000 of profit from selling their homes (or $500,000 for married couples). It’s a giant inducement to park your savings in home equity: neither stocks nor any other form of equity investment grows tax-free, unless it’s locked away in retirement or college-savings plans.
- The imputed rent exemption is a more curious beast. It waives from taxation the in-kind income homeowners receive through use of their homes. You may be thinking, “Huh?! Pay tax to live in my own house? That’s nuts!” In the terms of economists and tax accountants, though, it’s reasonable. If you lease your house to someone, you’ll be taxed on the rent you get from your tenant. Just so, if you live in the house yourself, you should pay tax on the monthly value of the shelter. Like much of accounting, it’s counterintuitive but logical. The imputed rent exemption likely denies the Treasury of more than $80 billion a year. In contrast, Switzerland imposes taxes on imputed rent, which makes it one of the only countries where taxpayers have no monetary advantages from owning rather than renting their homes. The Swiss choose buying or renting based on nonfinancial considerations, and fewer than 40 percent of households buy, compared with 67 percent in the United States.
The effects
Two recent summaries by prominent housing researchers synthesize the findings of a generation of scholars about the harms these policies cause.
In brief, tax breaks and hidden loan subsidies encourage speculation in home values. They cause buyers to put more money into their homes and less into other, productivity-enhancing investments. They bid up home prices in zoning-constrained high-price markets and escalate house and lot sizes at the top end of the market in more sprawling, less-expensive markets. For example, US housing policy boosts the prices of multi-million-dollar Victorians in San Francisco and speeds McMansion sprawl around Houston. It also exacerbates inequality. Because the tax breaks are much more valuable to households in high tax brackets, they skew the housing market away from first-time and entry-level buyers, who are mostly in lower tax brackets.
Because people of color were long prevented from owning homes by law and policy, this process of exclusionary price escalation reinforces wealth disparities by race and ethnicity.
Tax breaks and easier loans inflate prices across the entire real-estate market, driving up sticker prices and making it harder to break in. Ever more precariously leveraged borrowing was rampant in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis and persists. Because people of color were long prevented from owning homes by law and policy, this process of exclusionary price escalation reinforces wealth disparities by race and ethnicity. It concentrated mortgage foreclosures among people of color during the financial crisis and continues to do so today.
Easier loans plus tax breaks have damaged the economy overall and the environment as well. The diversion of capital into mortgage lending (a type of consumption) squeezes out investment in businesses (production). The net effect is slower productivity growth and job creation. Bigger houses use more energy and materials and typically spread over more land, augmenting sprawl and increasing climate-disrupting emissions both from the homes and the driving their locations necessitate.
In the end, the tax breaks for homeowners—not speaking of the mortgage system in this case—do not even increase homeownership. Because they elevate prices, they hurt first-time buyers and keep them out of the market. Homeownership is less common in the United States than in countries that provide no similar tax subsidies, such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
Peak horse-and-sparrow
Federal underregulation of mortgage finance peaked before the 2008 financial crisis; since then, a tightening of rules has somewhat dampened the systemic risk to the economy and reduced the chances of more bailouts. Still, securitization of mortgage loans remains a principal function of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Investors keep buying these risky instruments partly because they know the US government will not let the mortgage industry collapse. And mortgage loans are easier to get and at greater risk of default because of these policies.
Tax loopholes for homeowners, meanwhile, peaked before the 2017 tax reform. In 2015, these home-owner tax benefits arguably amounted to more than $240 billion, which is about five times as much as the United States provided in housing-related assistance to renters and low-income households that year. Another estimate placed the total closer to $210 billion. Either way, the 2017 reform trimmed the total to about $150 billion, a giant step in the right direction.
Further restraints on federal policies would ease the flow of money into home-value speculation and soften home prices. It would also dampen all the harms chronicled above.
Next time, I will turn to the politics of making that happen. For now, a glimpse at another model.
A different model?
What might a housing economy look like that no longer feeds the horses to feed the sparrows?
It might look something like the housing economies of German-speaking nations in Europe. The German mortgage industry, for example, is stodgy and closely regulated. Homeownership is less common in Germany than in North America, but it’s still widespread, with much lower home prices and more abundant housing. German renters, though, enjoy a level of security in their homes that would be unfamiliar to North Americans, because abundant apartment supply and German law both ensure a renter’s market and strong tenant rights in most cities.
Next door, Austria too gives no special favors to home buyers in tax law or banking regulations. Indeed, Austria subsidizes not mortgage lending but the production of thousands of ordinary urban apartments. The policy yields affordable, abundant housing; stable, long-term leases, as in Germany; and a real-estate economy far less driven by speculation.
In Switzerland, meanwhile, taxation of imputed rents means policy is neutral between buying and renting. Fewer people choose to buy there than almost anywhere in Europe, and housing is among the most affordable in Europe.
In these countries, housing policy is about housing, not real estate, so homeownership is a good way to live but a bad way to make money. And that’s as it should be. Could that be our future in North America as well?
Thomas Little
“neither stocks nor any other form of equity investment grows tax-free, unless it’s locked away in retirement or college-savings plans.”
In the US, taxes are only paid when gains are realized (i.e. sold), hence equity investments actually do “grow(s) tax-free.” Distributions from retirement accounts are also taxed. The capital gains tax exemption for home equity is much more closely related to the basis step-up on inheritances or 1031 exchanges, both of which are far more relevant to your argument.
Alan Durning
Thanks for your comment, Thomas.
I can’t see anything wrong with my original statement: capital gains on equity investments are still taxed, just not until sale. Capital gains on home investments are not taxed at all, until they exceed $250,000 (or $500,000 for married couples). And home-owner capital gains in excess of those thresholds are not taxed until sale, same as for other assets.
US retirement accounts are varied, of course: most are funded with pre-tax income but taxed on withdrawal. Roth IRAs are funded with post-tax income but untaxed on withdrawal. Still, unless I’m mistaken, their capital gains are not taxed as capital gains. They’re taxed as normal income on withdrawal, right?
I agree that the capital gains tax exemption for home equity was, until the late 1990s, parallel to 1031 exchanges for investment properties. It functioned in much the same way, except that it added a one-time opportunity to cash out, tax free, in people’s later years. Since the late 1990s, though, the capital gains exemption for owner-occupied housing has operated differently.
I agree that 1031 exchanges are another tax-policy favor to real-estate investment, and I mention them in my next article. (For the uninitiated, 1031 exchanges allow owners of rental properties to defer capital gains taxes indefinitely by investing their capital gains into other rental properties. As long as you keep “trading up,” you never pay capital gains taxes. Of course, something similar happens within mutual funds: capital gains from individual stocks don’t get taxed until you sell your stake in the entire fund.)
You’re right that the basis step-up on inheritances is a tax-fairness concern, but that’s a question in the separate realm of estate taxation. I don’t see it as relevant to this argument, because it applies to all assets: homes get no special treatment.
Perhaps I’m missing some subtlety that you can point out.
David Frank
Assets, including capital gains, held in a Roth IRA or in certain other account types are not taxed. Your statement, “They’re taxed as normal income on withdrawal, right?” is wrong. Assets in a Roth are not subject to tax.
Albert di Vittorio
I would have to disagree with the notion that Swiss housing is among the most affordable in Europe. Quite the contrary.
Alan Durning
Thanks for your comment, Albert. In my next few articles, I’ll write more about Switzerland. For today, here is one source.
Adam Zielinski
I agree with further repealing the mortgage interest deduction and SALT deduction. We also need to wind down and dissolve Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Also, in addition to zoning reforms, state and local governments should switch to a Land Value Tax instead of traditional property taxes that tax both land and buildings.
This would more effectively eliminate speculation and economic rent, and incentivize denser development without the need for top down command and control regulations.
asdf2
Agree that the mortgage interest deduction has never made sense as a sound national policy (although, I personally take advantage of it, as do many). The part that especially reeks is the government incentive to take the largest possible loan, via either a smaller down payment or choosing a more expensive home.
I also find it very ironic that the Party of Trump was the one that made the first dent in limiting it. I guess, it just goes to show that even a broken clock is right twice a day.
Dan W Immergluck
You conflate the causes of the S&L crisis and the subprime crisis. They were quite different. The S&L crisis was spurred by the deregulation of deposit rates as S&Ls faced pressure from money market funds and needed to offer higher yields to depositors. Because their assets were primarily long-term, fixed rate mortgages, this created a mismatch between the higher rates they began paying depositors and the lower, fixed rates of their SF mortgages. The result was that they sought more deregulation to enter the commercial real estate space that they were ill-equipped to do. This led to large losses, while they were still losing depositors. None of this was driven by defaults on their SF mortgage business. There are other significant oversimplifications in your piece as well. – Dan Immergluck, Professor, Georgia State University
Chris, Sightline donor!
I could be mistaken, but it seems to me that the 2017 tax law changes, while reducing the overall cost of these deductions to the treasury, also shifted the remaining benefits even more toward wealthy homeowners with large mortgages and large property tax bills. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) roughly doubled the standard deduction from $6,500 to $12,000 for individual filers and from $13,000 to $24,000 for joint returns, which means that if you have a modest mortgage and modest property taxes, you no longer reach the threshold for itemizing deductions. The tax benefits of your mortgage interest and property taxes are completely gone for people with low overall deductible expenses, i.e. people with less wealth. (Note: I am not an accountant, so I may be missing some complexity here.)
Alan Durning
Thanks for this note, Chris. You anticipated my next piece! The TCJA makes the mortgage interest deduction and other deductions the domain of rich families, which changes the politics too. You’ll see more soon!
Robert O Eggleston
The tax cut and jobs act substantially increased the standard deduction to $24,800 for a married couple, while capping SALT at $10,000 and lowering the maximum mortgage that has deductible interest. As a result about 90% of Americans will take the standard deduction on their Federal income taxes. The ways that you might not involve A) Donating a lot to charity (encouraging this seems reasonable) B) If your mortgage is between around $400,000-$750,000 so that mortgage interest on a 3.5% mortgage would be between around $14,000-$26,250 (combined with $10,000 in state and local taxes you might go over the $24,800) or C) people who own a business and are able to pass lots of expenses through that.
Mary Vogel
Alan, I’m so glad that you are getting ready to lead an evolutionary revision of our federal housing system! I first saw via your post on the P:NW Facebook site–where I commented immediately. I was so delighted that your article reinforced at least part of an article that I originally published on the same day–Feb 12.* See Brave New US Housing Policy on my PlanGreen site: text to display
I have since incorporated your piece into my own post via link to your URL. I’ve largely been waiting to hear from the young people that I was writing my piece for before publicizing it more widely. And, I got busy trying to get a spot on US Senate Finance Committee Chair, Ron Wyden’s Town Halls to talk with him online.
Anyway, I hope you–and your audience here– will comment on my blog as well!
*But because of several IT issues, I published mine on my old blog site; then needed to migrate it to my current site. . .
Thanks! Mary